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Abstract 
This paper discusses the role of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement as a strategic tool for Japan 
in pursuing its national and regional interests. While it is undeniable that the economic benefits to be 
accrued from the agreement in terms of boosting Japan’s economic growth are important and well argued, 
Tokyo’s motivation to engage the TPP is driven more by its geopolitical and strategic calculations. The 
former serves middle to long-term ambition while the latter takes on short to middle term goals. Centering 
on the latter, the paper discusses three major motivations: 1) the use of the TPP to exert innovation and 
drive change at home in maintaining its strategic competitiveness; 2) the perceived importance of the TPP 
as a rule setter for regional economic cooperation; and 3) the significance of the TPP in balancing Beijing’s 
strategic influence in the region. China’s move to fortify its relations with neighboring countries through its 
own initiatives in an unending tussle with the US could see the formation of two opposing trade blocs in the 
Asia Pacific region. Japan can play a significant role in bridging the gap and contribute to the possibility of 
convergence. 
Keywords: Japan, China, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Free trade agreement, Geopolitical 
 
Introduction 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has often been billed as a highly ambitious 21st century regional free 
trade agreement not simply because of having the objective to address new global trade and investment 
challenges in the new millennia, but also to push cooperation beyond the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in many areas including the protection of intellectual property, environment, and labor. With 30 chapters, the 
TPP agreement (TPPA) is promoted as a “high-standard, ambitious, comprehensive, and balanced agreement 
that will promote economic growth; support the creation and retention of jobs; enhance innovation, 
productivity and competitiveness; raise living standards; reduce poverty in our countries; and promote 
transparency, good governance, and enhanced labor and environmental protections” (USTR, 2015). 2 The 
TPPA was finally signed on 4 February 2016 after twelve participating countries, namely Australia, Brunei, 
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States and Vietnam 
concluded negotiations that lasted for 5 and a half years. 3 
The significance of the TPPA to smaller participating nations such as Malaysia, Vietnam, Peru and 
Chile lies in their ability to take advantage of the perceived economic benefits in enhancing their national 
economic development and thrusting them ahead of non-TPP countries by increasing their competitiveness 
in international trade. Malaysia’s Trade Minister Mustapa Mohamed foresees that the TPP will add a further 
9% in preferential access that would allow Malaysian exporters “to enjoy a better footing than neighboring 
competitors” (New Straits Times, 2014).  
While bigger and more advanced member countries such as the US and Japan would benefit 
economically as well, the TPP’s contribution to them lies more in its perceived role as a strategic tool in 
great power rivalry. For the US, the TPPA forms a vital part of its ‘rebalancing’ policy that would position 
the US as an economic leader in the Asia Pacific region (See Froman, 2014; Bader and Dollar, 2015). Hence, 
the TPPA becomes the litmus test of “U.S. credibility as a regional leader” (Williams, et. al., 2016: 3). The 
failure of the agreement will not only weaken US’s leadership role but could provide opportunity for China 
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to take the lead in developing a regional order. The strategic significance of the TPP has not only been 
argued by scholars and observers but acknowledged by leaders as well. At the 2015 Shangri-la Dialogue in 
Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong spoke that “[b]ecause whatever the merits or demerits of 
individual line items of trade covered in the TPP, the agreement has a wider strategic significance. Getting 
the TPP done will deepen links on both sides of the Pacific. Failing to get the TPP done will hurt the 
credibility and standing of the US not just in Asia, but worldwide” (Lee, 2015). 
Considering that the TPP contains a key geo-economic element, what then would be the motivational 
factors for Japan to join the TPP? To what extent was China’s rise and economic prowess a major concern 
for Japan in its deliberations to participate in the TPP? Although Japan is a strong ally of the US, it did not 
commit itself to the TPP until July 2013, the last member to join. The argument advanced in this paper is 
three fold. Firstly, Tokyo realizes that external pressure is needed in recalibrating its economy to drive 
change at home and enhance its strategic competitiveness vis-à-vis Beijing. Secondly, the high standards set 
by the participants and the wide coverage of chapters under negotiation captured Tokyo’s attention despite 
realizing the difficulties ensued. Thirdly, China’s rapid economic transformation and its geostrategic role in 
the region featured prominently in Japan’s calculation to participate in the TPP. The objective of this paper is 
primarily to elucidate insights into Japan’s approach of using the TPP as a strategic tool of choice. This paper 
is thus divided into four subsequent sections with the first three sections discussing the three arguments 
respectively and the last section concludes the paper. 
 
Theoretical Orientation 
The perspective that the international system remains anarchic and power rivalries between strong states 
continue to be a prevailing feature, motivates the questions and arguments put forth in this paper. Under such 
conditions, states are unitary and rational actors that would seek to optimize their interests and influence not 
only to ensure but also enhance their survivability (see Waltz, 1979). The lack of trust and the seeming 
relative losses of power may force states to cooperate to balance against a perceived threat. 
Tokyo has been rather apprehensive about China’s economic rise and its impact on Japan’s regional 
economic influence. However, it would be a mistake to conveniently assume that structural challenges would 
necessarily lead to a zero sum game. The TPP may exemplify the dominant role of Japan and the US in a 
new economic cooperative framework that are meant to check China’s political and economic advances in 
the region but no TPP members have ever proposed a clause or provision to prevent any Asia Pacific 
countries from becoming a member. As such, China may choose to participate under the negotiated 
economic rules of the TPPA or develop alternative approaches to counter the perceived threat of the TPP to 
its economic interests.   
Framing the discussion within the systemic perspective, unfortunately, has its limitations. This is 
because Japan’s motivations in joining the TPP were not merely structural but were equally informed by 
domestic considerations. As Helen Milner points out, domestic political dynamics involving multitude of 
actors can shape the foreign policies of states and determine their behavior on whether to engage in 
international cooperation (Milner, 1997). Japan’s decision to realistically engage other countries in the TPP 
process was made after lengthy deliberations among domestic actors and the determination of the Abe 
administration to consider the TPP as a critical foreign policy choice that could lend credence to his agenda 
for long-term economic reform. The value of the TPP for Japan can therefore be effectively explained by the 
combination of systemic pressures and domestic level factors. 
The TPP as a Pressure for Economic Revitalization 
Ever since the 2006 Pacific-4 Free Trade Agreement (officially called the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership Agreement) between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore was expanded into the TPP with 
the US’s involvement in 2008, Japan has been seriously debating the advantages and disadvantages of 
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joining the grouping. Arguably, Japan was caught unprepared by the move of the US to develop the TPP. 
Tokyo did not pay much attention to the P-4 FTA because it was focusing instead on realizing its idea of a 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia or CEPEA (involving 16 nations including China) and 
establishing an Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) that was to serve as a crucial 
support mechanism to the development of CEPEA. These two proposals were known as the Nikai Initiative 
(named after the then Trade Minister Toshihiro Nikai) and were meant to demonstrate Japan’s leading role in 
regional economic integration as well as to aid in achieving the final goal of a Free Trade Area of the Asia 
Pacific (FTAAP) (Teh, 2011). 
By the time the US had expressed its commitment to the TPP, CEPEA was undergoing two phases of 
feasibility study (the final report of Phase II Track 2 Study Group on CEPEA was submitted in October 2009 
at the 4th EAS Summit in Cha-am, Thailand), ASEAN was undecided in adopting the China-supported East 
Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) or the Japan-proposed CEPEA, Thailand as host was undergoing one of its 
worst political crisis in 2008-09 that caused the 4th East Asia Summit (EAS) to be rescheduled several times, 
and the sudden introduction of new proposals – the “Asia Pacific Community” by then Australian Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd and the “East Asian Community” (EAC) by then Japanese Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama. With the various regional economic ideas and frameworks remained at the drawing board, the 
attractiveness of the P-4 FTA to the US seemed rather clear – a high-quality agreement that was already in 
force and welcomed accession by other economies. Meanwhile, the push factor for the US, argues Tashiro 
Yoichi of Otsuma Women’s University, was the 2008 economic recession and the need to reassert its political 
economic leadership in the Asia Pacific (Yoichi, 2012). Interestingly, the TPP is the only region-wide 
economic framework that has the potential to expand and is not under ASEAN’s leadership. Japan was torn 
between promoting its interest in CEPEA, which would be deemed ‘friendlier’ since it is perceived as less 
ambitious and would allow an exclusion list, and joining the US in the TPP, which is highly ambitious and 
require all sectors to be included in negotiation. 
In November 2010, two years after the US confirmed its participation in the TPP, then Prime Minister 
of Japan Naoto Kan pledged to bring Japan into the TPP. His decision irked his predecessor, Yukio 
Hatoyama, who had promoted a closer Sino-Japanese relation through his EAC concept. At the Foreign 
Correspondence’s Club in February 2011, Hatoyama had mentioned that: 
“I'd like to ask [Naoto] Kan why his administration has dumped the concept of an East Asian 
community in favour of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. While I agree with Kan that Japan should be opened 
up, I don’t agree with his method. It seems to be the thinking of the bureaucracy, especially the Foreign 
Ministry with its strong inclination to join the TPP… It’s a reversion to the situation under (former Prime 
Minister Junichiro) Koizumi. Everyone is focused on the US rather than Asia. I feel that rather than pushing 
forward with the TPP, it’s better for Japan to focus on relations with Asia” (quoted in Sharp, 2011). 
Hatoyama’s disapproval of Kan’s decision on the TPP highlighted two important points. Firstly, the 
TPP was viewed as a US-led initiative capable of negatively affecting Japan’s relations with its Asian 
counterparts, particularly China. Secondly, the Foreign Ministry of Japan is seen as playing a prominent role 
in trying to enhance the nation’s strategic interests through trade by moving Tokyo closer to Washington. In 
contrast to the position of the Foreign Ministry, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 
saw the economic importance of including China and the cost for excluding it. It pushed for the realization of 
CEPEA but at the same time acknowledged the TPP as one of the plausible routes to an FTAAP (see METI, 
2010).  
Naoto Kan’s decision to engage the TPP countries marked a significant turning point. The Basic Policy 
on Comprehensive Economic Partnerships released in November 2010 made clear Japan’s posture of 
engaging in higher quality FTAs and commitment to domestic reforms. It mentioned that: 
 
 “…the Government of Japan is absolutely resolved to ‘open up the country’ and ‘pioneer a new 
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future’...With regard to EPAs or broader regional economic partnerships that are politically and economically 
important and will be of especially great benefit to Japan, the Government of Japan, while taking into 
consideration the sensitivity of trade in certain products, will subject all goods to negotiations for trade 
liberalization and, through such negotiations, pursue high-level economic partnerships” and in order to do so, 
it “will first promote appropriate domestic reforms with respect to areas of the agricultural industry, 
movement of natural persons from abroad to Japan, and regulatory reforms” (MOFA, 2010). 
The importance of the TPP and its relations to the call for domestic reforms is captured by then Foreign 
Minister Seiji Maehara’s remarks that “[i]f we don’t seriously consider opening the nation up, we could soon 
lose our competitive edge... (By not joining the TPP) aren’t we sacrificing much of the 98.5 percent (of the 
economy that isn’t primary industry) for the 1.5 percent that is?” (Sharp, 2010). In January 2011, Kan 
reshuffled his cabinet, replacing Trade Minister Akihiro Ohata who had opposed agricultural trade 
liberalization with Banri Kaieda who was strongly in favor of Japan’s participation in the TPP (Mulgan, 
2011). Much of the debates that transpired in Japan were centered on those who saw the TPP as the golden 
arrow that would lift Japan’s competitiveness and create value added in non-competitive sectors, and those 
who saw the TPP as a force that will undermine Japan’s long held protected sectors and threaten traditional 
customs and practices caused by sudden influx of cheap foreign goods. The Central Union of Agricultural 
Cooperatives (JA-Zenchu) saw the TPP as counterproductive, foreseeing that agricultural production would 
decrease by 4.1 billion yen and self-sufficiency rate will plummet from 40% to 14% (JACOM, 2010). The 
Nishoren or Consumers Union of Japan warned of possible food safety issues caused by the loosening of 
food regulatory policies due to the TPPA. However, the unfortunate Great East Japan Earthquake in March 
2011 further intensified domestic debates over the country’s direction on the TPP issue.  
METI’s 2011 White Paper on International Economy and Trade discussed the value of the TPP as one 
of the key strategies for the revitalization of Japan by referring to the strengthening of “kizuna” (bonds of 
friendship) with other countries through the promotion of high-level economic partnerships, namely the TPP. 
This strategy was based on two key reasoning. Firstly, Japan was falling behind in terms of its ratio of trade 
covered by the signed and in effect FTAs to its total trade value which was at 17.6%, lower than China’s at 
21.5%, South Korea’s at 35.8%, and the US’s at 38.0%. Secondly, Japan’s EPAs were of lower liberalization 
rate at about 86-87% on a tariff line basis compared to US-Australia FTA, US-Peru FTA, US-South Korea 
FTA and South Korea-EU FTA which were all above 95% (METI, 2011).  
Although the earthquake incident exposed the government’s lack of preparedness and caused Kan his 
top position, the TPP idea was kept alive under Yoshihiko Noda’s leadership and further pursued under the 
current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as part of his third arrow growth strategy. One of Abe’s aims is to 
increase the FTA trade ratio by 3.7 times to 70% by 2018 (Kantei, 2013: 128). To achieve this rather 
ambitious aim, the TPP is given greater emphasis as it serves to propel Japan’s FTA proliferation, particularly 
of those with higher standards, and catch up with other trading nations apart from augmenting its economic 
competitiveness.  
In order to utilize the TPP to boost Japan’s liberalization rate, Tokyo will need to dismantle obstacles to 
its domestic reforms. South Korea’s high liberalization rate in its FTA with the US, for example, did not 
come without protest and painful reforms. According to Aurelia George Mulgan, Professor of Politics at the 
University of New South Wales, the main obstacles to Japan’s trade reform “have been a divided 
bureaucracy, politically well organized and entrenched protectionist interests, and institutionalized 
opposition from ruling party politicians, who have acted directly to block their own government’s trade 
policy initiatives from within the policy making process” (Mulgan, 2014a: 27). She further adds that “[a]s a 
result, trade negotiations involving Japan have often taken years to complete, with the results falling far short 
of the levels of trade liberalization desired by Japan’s trading partners (Ibid). The tug of war between 
ministries and the domestic debates between pro- and anti-TPP camps were most pronounced when 
compared to any other FTAs that Japan has engaged in. In making the case for Japan’s TPP participation, 
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METI for example came out with their estimation that the country would see its GDP rise by 10.5 trillion yen 
with 812,000 new jobs while MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) countered with their 
own calculation showing a decline of 7.9 trillion yen in GDP and 3.4 million job losses (Ibid: 27).  
Therefore, a successful TPP negotiation for Japan hinges on the Abe administration’s ability to reduce 
internal obstacles to trade reform before it is able to leverage on the TPP as an external tool to exert pressure 
for more structural changes. One of the biggest challenges in objecting to Japan’s inclusion in the TPP is in 
the agricultural sector. Although political observers such as Adam Posen, president of Peterson Institute for 
International Economics and Richart Katz, editor of The Oriental Economist Alert, have suggested that Abe 
lacks political will despite “conditions are ripe for a determined prime minister to override the powerful farm 
lobby” (Xinhuanet, 2014; Katz, 2014), there has been progress in agricultural reforms such as the 
consideration to increase corporate involvement in agriculture to boost competitiveness (Takada, 2014) and 
the role of electoral reforms in the 1990s in reducing the political influence of the Japan Agricultural 
Cooperatives (JA) (Pollmann, 2014) to a point whereby “the focus of debate is no longer whether to reform 
agriculture but rather when and how to do it” (Maclachlan and Shimizu, 2014). The appointment of Hiroshi 
Moriyama, founder of an anti-TPP caucus with 63% of the 408 LDP representatives in both Houses in the 
Diet as members, as the head of the Liberal Democratic Party’s Task Force on the TPP in September 2014, 
taking over from Koya Nishikawa, may have appeared as if Abe lacks the willpower but it instead showcased 
the delicate balance that the Abe administration has to tread to earn the support of anti-TPP policymakers in 
dismantling the old agricultural regime represented by the JA. Nishikawa and Moriyama recognized the need 
for reform but were adamant to maintain protection of the five sacred sectors (rice, beef and pork, sugar, 
wheat, and dairy) of which the Abe administration did acknowledge as a pre-condition to Japan’s 
participation in the TPP process. To further ensure Japan’s commitment in the TPP, the government removed 
JA-Zenchu’s legal mandate “to audit and guide regional cooperatives across the country” as the first step in 
reducing the power that JA wields since it is considered as the “keystone of the whole anti-TPP movement in 
Japan” (The Japan Times, 2015a; Matthews, 2015). 
The stalling of the TPP negotiation process due to Japan’s adamant request for exemptions and special 
quotas of sensitive agricultural products not only underlines the tough negotiations predominantly on the 
bilateral track between the US and Japan but equally perhaps as a strategy for Japan to hold back from 
conceding too much until Tokyo could confirm that Washington possesses the Trade Promotion Authority 
needed to push the deal through Congress. With the signing of the TPPA, it has become clear that leveraging 
on the TPP to push for domestic structural reforms remains a challenge since Tokyo was only able to attain 
95.1% of tariff removal compared to nearly 100% for the other members (The Japan Times, 2015b). On 
agricultural products alone, Japan will eventually remove tariffs on 81% of products (compared to 90% and 
above for the other TPP members) and 30% of items under the five sacred sectors (Nikkei Asian Review, 
2015). Rice remains protected with import quota set at 56,000 tons, and 78,400 tons from the 13th year 
onwards. Despite the shortcomings, they are the highest tariff removal rates that Japan has ever achieved in 
its FTAs. Japan has initiated the ratification process of the TPPA and will table it in the September 2016 
extraordinary Diet session for ratification. Key figures such as Yuji Yamamoto who has been appointed as 
the Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in August 2016 are expected to play their crucial roles in 
defending the TPPA against anti-TPP protesters, particularly the opposition parties. 
The TPP as a Rule Setter in Advancing Japan’s Regional Interests 
The second strategic value of the TPP is the perceived rule-making aspect of the agreement. The TPPA is, 
argues proponents, a high-level new age agreement that includes many WTO-plus issues, hence goes beyond 
simple tariff elimination. Apart from the ambitious goal of the TPPA to achieve 100% liberalization rate, it is 
in the area of non-tariff barriers that provides a vital opportunity for TPP members to play a critical role in 
setting trade rules that could potentially affect future economic activities covering the whole of the Asia 
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Pacific. Those trade rules would cover areas such as competition, labor, government procurement, 
intellectual property, investment and services.  
The nation’s most powerful business lobby, the Japan Business Federation or more commonly 
known as Keidanren issued a statement titled “Recommendations on Japan’s Trade Strategy” in 2011 urging 
the government not to waste time in joining the TPP in order to be directly involved in the rule-making 
process and secure Japan’s long term business interests and economic growth in the Asia Pacific region 
(Keidanren, 2011). In June 2013, the government answered the call with its blueprint for structural reform 
titled “Japan Revitalization Strategy: Japan is Back”. Issued a month before Tokyo’s official participation in 
the TPP negotiations, the document states that “the government will draw up new rules in Asia Pacific region 
by working positively on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations and use these rules as a basis for 
discussion of rule-making for Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP)” (Kantei, 2013: 128).  
The perceived potential of the TPP obviously sets it apart from other bilateral and regional FTA frameworks 
including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) currently under negotiations. While 
Tokyo would have preferred more time to iron out differing opinions on the TPP at home prior to entry, the 
rapid progress made in the TPP negotiation rounds add urgency and pressure on the Japanese government to 
take the big leap and start its negotiation process with the other TPP member countries. This action was 
primarily motivated by two key factors. Firstly, Tokyo was concerned that the new rules agreed under the 
TPPA could adversely affect its economic growth and cloud its political influence in the region should it 
decide not to join. Secondly, Tokyo did not want to lose the golden opportunity to be part of the rule-making 
process and be forced to accept the TPP rules should it decide to participate after the negotiation process has 
ended and the agreement enforced. 
These concerns would most likely derived from the conviction that the TPP represents the most 
promising route to an FTAAP that Tokyo has been supporting since the idea came about in 2006. The 
opportunity to create a common set of rules under the TPP would not only help to address the issue of 
overlapping bilateral FTAs that affects the operation of business supply chains but also to go beyond the 
constraints of the WTO by establishing rules in areas not covered by the WTO and further expanding them 
beyond the TPPA to form “a global set of rules” (Urata, 2016). However, it is similarly the rule-making 
factor that some TPP opponents saw as the danger for which Japan should rightly avoid. Anti-TPP protesters 
were justifiably worried about the secretive nature of the negotiation process. By keeping the public in the 
dark, opponents were concerned that their government may compromise too much in the negotiation process, 
or may use the TPPA to push for subsequent unpopular reforms or to dismantle powerful interest groups that 
threatens the power base of the ruling party. 
There is thus an enduring issue of trust for the present government. Undeterred, Shinzo Abe was 
reported to have said a day after the TPPA text was released for public scrutiny that “[r]ules should not be 
something that are imposed on you – you make them. The TPP is the structure where Japan and the US can 
lead in economic rule-making” (The Japan Times, 2015b). However, the effectiveness of the TPPA in 
charting new trade rules for the region remains to be seen since the signed document will need to go through 
the legislative process of each of the member countries before it could be legally enforced and most 
importantly whether US President Barack Obama will be able to have the TPPA ratified by Congress without 
further renegotiations before his term ends in January 2017. Obama faces an uphill battle as his own party 
and the Congress have become increasingly sceptical of the TPP. Both 2016 US presidential candidates, 
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, have also voiced their reservations over the ratification of the TPPA. 
While Trump has publicly spoken against the trade deal, Clinton viewed it as falling short of her 
expectations. With the latter leading the presidential race, the realization of the TPP remains a possibility. If 
Obama fails to ratify the TPPA and Clinton wins the election, she may opt to reopen negotiations to secure 
additional terms for the US before seeking congressional approval. This, however, will prove problematic as 
Japan has made it clear that it will not entertain any renegotiation requests (The Japan Agri News, 2016). 
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Obtaining an early approval from the Diet could lend support to Obama’s efforts in seeking ratification and 
perhaps weaken the voices of TPP opponents in the US from calling for a renegotiation (The Japan News, 
2016). 
The TPP as a Balancer to China’s Strategic Influence in the Asia Pacific 
China’s rapid economic rise and the political clout that it commands in the Asia Pacific region creates unease 
in Tokyo and Washington. The development of the TPP is therefore seen as a response to check China’s 
growing influence in the region. However, is the TPP designed to contain China by keeping it out or to 
include it under US-Japan determined rules? Some scholars and observers such as David Piling (2013) have 
argued that the TPP is an economic containment strategy to prevent China from developing its own regional 
economic order (see also Drysdale, 2011). 4 Arguing that the TPP deliberately targets China, Professor of 
International Studies at Peking University, Wang Yong, argued that China’s rise is eroding “the economic 
foundation of the US-led security order in East Asia” and by centering on the TPP, where the US could take 
the lead, instead of the EAFTA or RCEP, it hopes to thwart “the emergence of a China-centered East Asian 
economic bloc”, constraint “the centrifugal tendencies of allies Japan, South Korea and Australia, which are 
attracted by China’s growing economic power”, and have “a decisive say over the direction of the 
multilateral trading system, and dealing with the challenges from China and other emerging economies” in 
order to wrestle back control of the region (Wang, 2013).  
Contrary to such arguments, the strategic intent of the TPP was never to deny China entry but to 
welcome it under US-Japan leadership. While member countries such as Australia and New Zealand do not 
want the TPP to be turned into a “project to isolate and antagonise China” (New Zealand Herald, 2014), 
Japan and the US do not want to see China create its own rules in the region that could undermine or run 
contrary to their interests. Japan’s then Economy Minister Akira Amari remarked in May 2014 that “China is 
the world's second largest economy but rules governing the economy have been extremely opaque and 
unpredictable. This extreme opaqueness would hinder trade… It's inevitable that China would have to join 
the TPP... The TPP can play a major role to eliminate that opaqueness” (Waki and Sithole-Matarise, 2014). 
Barack Obama made it even clearer in an interview with Wall Street Journal that “if we don’t write the rules, 
China will write the rules out in that region. We will be shut out” (Seib, 2015).  
For the US, China is the prized money and getting Japan to come onboard the TPP was fundamental. 
As aptly emphasized by Aurelia Mulgan, “Japan’s participation amplifies both the economic and strategic 
importance of the TPP for the US. Japan’s involvement enables the TPP to effectively compete with the 
China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which involves Japan but not the US. 
Absent Japan, the TPP becomes a bit of a sideshow in the US strategic game against China and hardly the 
vehicle to facilitate the US rebalancing to Asia that America would like it to be” (Mulgan, 2014b). Tokyo is 
fully aware of the strategic role that Japan plays in the TPP as reflected by then LDP Secretary General 
Shigeru Ishiba’s comment to Akira Amari that “the TPP without Japan is pointless” (Ibid). In no ambiguous 
terms, Japan recognizes the strategic value of the TPP and uses it as a tool to further its national interests.  
The rule-making factor not only brings Tokyo closer to Washington and indirectly help realize the 
Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) 5 set out 25 years ago (Parker, 2014) but more significantly functions 
to pressure Beijing to reform its economic policies by putting in place clearer trade rules and regulations in 
line with internationally accepted norms so as to enable it to join the TPP and reap the economic benefits on 
offer. Instead of trying to contain China, the main strategy is for the US and Japan to complete writing the 
rules and then pull China into the regional grouping by having it sign on to the agreed rules after the 
                                                             
4 For a counter argument to David Piling, see Solis (2013). 
5 The SII was a 1989 initiative between the US and Japan to discuss ways on reducing trade imbalance that has caused 
increased tension in their economic relations. The initiative however failed to yield positive results and was terminated 
in 1993. 
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agreement comes into effect. It is thus necessary to promote and maintain the TPPA negotiations at a high 
standard to thwart China’s interest to participate until the deal is sealed. Despite the TPP being proclaimed 
for its economic benefits, it is not originally designed to be fully inclusive (Tiezzi, 2015). The aim of using 
the TPP to pressure China in realigning its policies is evident from Obama’s remarks that “we hope that then 
China actually joins us in not necessarily formally being a member of TPP but in adopting some of the best 
practices that ensure fairness in operations” (The White House, 2014).  
The question, however, is whether the TPP wields enough power to entice China to join and accept 
the new rules or will Beijing opt to develop its own trading bloc. As Mireya Solis has aptly pointed out, “The 
most fundamental challenge to the TPP project vis-à-vis China is not that it is built around a faulty notion of 
containment, but rather that it may not constitute a powerful enough enticement to propel China to sign on to 
these new standards on trade and investment (Solis, 2013). Indeed, China has not been sitting idly as the TPP 
took shape but has instead shown greater resolve to push for progress in the China-Japan-Korea FTA, 
prioritizing its FTA with South Korea and actively promoting and supporting the RCEP, which have entered 
their 11th round of negotiations (as of February 2016) (Jin, 2013; Yoshimatsu 2014).  
Even with the TPP in place, China may still diffuse some of the TPP’s perceived impact on its 
economy through the promotion of competing regional integration concepts. In May 2014, China, Japan and 
South Korea signed and put into effect their agreement for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of 
Investment, and more significantly a report on Beijing’s proposal to set up a mega FTAAP as an alternative 
to the US-led TPP was issued at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) senior officials’ meeting 
(The BRICS Post, 2014). Three months later in August, China and ASEAN came to an agreement to start 
negotiations on upgrading their existing bilateral FTA. China is not only focusing on East Asia but is 
building up its influence in Central Asia under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) that has 
recently expanded to include India and Pakistan. Beijing has also strengthened its presence by leading the 
BRICS Development Bank and BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement to provide loans and combat 
currency crises (The BRICS Post, 2015). In October 2013, China proposed the establishment of a new 
USD100 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and it has begun its operations in January 
2016. With the US and Japan as chief shareholders of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) respectively, it is not surprising that they saw the AIIB as a “lending rival” (Aiyar, 2015). 6 The AIIB 
and the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiatives are strategic ideas that could challenge the TPP’s strategic 
role and lead to competing models of regionalism with the US and China on opposing ends (see Terada, 
2015). 
These various endeavors are meant to promote China’s interests and reduce the perceived 
disadvantage of being excluded from the TPPA. While China does not dismiss the TPP altogether, it rejects 
the idea of the TPP being the main, if not only, route to an FTAAP. This demonstrates its refusal to be 
subjugated. There is thus a need to carefully consider the long term risk of an East Asian region splitting into 
two blocs instead of a single unified FTAAP, perhaps similar in some ways to the failed FTAA when Brazil 
strongly objected to US’s attempt to extend its “rules and regimes across the Americas” (Steinbock, 2014). 
 
RCEP vs. TPP 
Will Tokyo’s plan to get Beijing on board the TPP works? This may depend on how China views not only the 
economic cost but also the political and strategic implications involved. A 2014 study by Peter Petri, Michael 
Plummer and Fan Zhai estimated that if the TPPA is expanded into 17 countries with the additional inclusion 
of China, Indonesia, South Korea, Philippines and Thailand, China will benefit as much as USD808.6 billion 
                                                             
6 Aiyar (2015) argues convincingly that it is not because the AIIB will become a political tool of China that the US and 
Japan are against it since the ADB and the World Bank have been used by Japan and the US in promoting their own 
foreign policies respectively, but the notion that the AIIB will reduce the dominating role of the World Bank and the 
ADB.  
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by 2025 compared to USD249.7 in the RCEP (Petri, Plummer and Zhai, 2014: 84). Other existing TPP 
members will see their income gains increase too. US’s income gain will quadruple from USD76.6 billion to 
USD327.6 billion while Japan will see an increase from USD104.6 billion to USD237.3 billion (Ibid: 84). 
Much of the gains would come from China’s participation. However, the economic cost to China for not 
joining the TPP is estimated at USD34.8 billion (Ibid: 84). Noticeably, China’s entry into the TPP will not 
merely bring economic value for itself but will generate enormous benefits to the other TPP members as 
well. 
Considering that the TPP negotiations have been finalized and remained a high standard agreement, 
it will prove difficult for China to accede without major economic reforms. Joining the TPP will mean 
bringing China’s policies in line with the beliefs, norms and interests of the US and Japan. Washington and 
Tokyo would want to see Beijing adopt policies that are transparent and predictable, introduce regulations in 
line with global best practices and further open up its economy. This is the ultimate strategic feature of the 
TPP. Japan did not participate in the TPP simply to reduce tariffs but to build common values with 
likeminded states and to reduce overreliance on the Chinese economy (Terada, 2015). The latter will not be 
an easy task to achieve since China’s economy is well entrenched in the international system. 
China will most likely speed up negotiations in the RCEP (pushed by China and excludes the US), 
which are scheduled to conclude by the end of 2016. This comes after China managed to reinstate the 
FTAAP idea as host of the APEC summit in November 2014 despite strong objections from the US to 
exclude it from the joint communiqué for fear that it would derail progress made in the TPP (Davis, 2014). 
The importance of realizing an FTAAP was once again reiterated by Beijing at the APEC summit in 
November 2015. 7 The main reason for China to keep the FTAAP concept alive is to prevent the TPP from 
becoming the ultimate vehicle for the realization of an Asia-Pacific wide FTA since it would mean acceding 
to the TPPA and hence subscribing to American leadership (Solis, 2014). If China decides not to hop on the 
TPP bandwagon, a possible outcome would be a competition in rule making between the RCEP and the TPP 
towards the aim of achieving an Asia-Pacific wide FTA (FTAAP). While a convergence between the RCEP 
and the TPP would be an ideal solution, “[d]ifferences not only in levels of ambition, but also in the nature of 
those ambitions, loom as potentially the largest obstacles to convergence between the TPP and the RCEP” 
(Scollay, 2014: 243-244). This differences is aptly elaborated by Takashi Terada when he commented that 
“[a]s ASEAN has also shown an interest in RCEP, in which the speed and level of liberalisation would be 
based on the standard that developing countries generally prefer, the dissimilarities in these integration 
models in the Asia Pacific region make any future merger of TPP and RCEP difficult. This also means the 
US and China will continue to compete against each other over trade and investment rule-making in East 
Asia and the Pacific” (Terada, 2013). 
Japan, however, can play a significant role in closing the gap since it is party to both frameworks. 
With its experience in the TPP negotiations and its ability to increase its liberalization rate, Japan is poised to 
push for higher liberalization rate and cover more WTO-plus issues in the RCEP. It will have the backing of 
ASEAN countries such as Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and Singapore who are already members of the TPP 
and may gain support from Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and South Korea who could be willing to 
improve their trade liberalization rate since they have expressed their interest to join the TPP. China’s 
economic slowdown could also lead to greater deregulations and policy improvements. Reducing the gap as 
much as possible between the two frameworks will contribute to the future possibility of convergence in the 
forming of an FTAAP. Furthermore, the fact that Japan views the new rules in the TPP not as a zero-sum 
game but as “a basis for discussion of rule-making” for the FTAAP enables it to play a vital role in bridging 
the concerns of the US and China (Kantei, 2013: 128). 
 
                                                             
7 A ‘collective strategic study’ on the FTAAP is currently underway and is expected to be completed by the end of 2016. 
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Conclusion 
The key factor that affects China’s assessment of the TPP is not the US but a combined US-Japan. China had 
earlier dismissed the TPP idea as a containment policy of the US but softened its position when Japan 
decided to officially join the TPP negotiations (see Li, 2014). Admittedly, China lost the opportunity to join 
hands with Japan in constructing an East Asian region when Tokyo extended an olive branch to Beijing. As 
Yoichiro Sato, Professor of International Strategic Studies at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University observed, 
“China’s failure to fully embrace Hatoyama’s half-cooked ‘East Asian Community’ concept at the East Asian 
Summit meeting in October 2009 was perhaps the beginning of Japan’s return to normalcy” (Sato, 2010). Far 
from its trade value, the TPP provides an opportunity for Japan to rebuild and enhance if not to seal its 
relations with the US, starting with Naoto Kan and continuing with Shinzo Abe.  
The TPP, pushed by the Abe administration as part of its third arrow strategy, serves Abe’s 
commitment to domestic structural reforms and his realization of the need to open up the country to enhance 
Japan’s strategic and economic competitiveness. Beyond that, the TPP solidifies Japan’s relations with 
likeminded countries particularly the US and to check China’s growing regional influence. Containing China 
is neither Washington’s nor Tokyo’s plan but getting Beijing to join and subscribe to the TPPA after its 
completion is. While Japan’s involvement in the TPP process has contributed to China’s reassessment of the 
TPP potential due to its rule-making factor, setting the bar too high may only discourage Beijing and may 
cause it to move away from engaging the TPP as its present initiatives seems to suggest. This may eventually 
lead to an unwanted division of the region into two powerful trade blocs – one led by China and the other by 
the US.  
Japan, unlike Australia or New Zealand, or even Malaysia, values the strategic worth of the TPP and 
is therefore in support of the US’s strategic objectives. Tokyo is not merely concerned with China’s 
economic and military assertiveness but as Ichiyo Muto, the founder of People’s Plan Study Group and an 
anti-war activist, observes, Tokyo needs Washington’s unwavering support in realizing Abe’s plan to move 
the nation towards full ‘normalization’ (Personal communication, 25 October 2014). The TPP, if successfully 
enforced, will undoubtedly strengthen US-Japan’s geopolitical and geoeconomic interests, and stands to 
threaten China’s economic prowess. Converging the TPP and the RCEP to form an FTAAP would be the best 
solution if only Beijing, Tokyo and Washington are willing to put their political calculations and tactical 
differences aside for the sake of the region’s integration and the prosperity of its people. 
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